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FEDERAL REGULATION OF STATE
EMPLOYMENT UNDER THE COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND "NATIONAL DEFENSE" POWERS:
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY
THE PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE
COOPERATION ACT
Abstract: Pending before Congress is the Public Safety Employer-Em-
ployee Cooperation Act, which would require states and their localities to
engage in collective bargaining with unions representing their public
safety officers (i.e., police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical
services workers). As constitutional authority for the Act, the legislation
invokes the Commerce Clause and congressional "national defense" pow-
ers. This Note examines Congress's ability to regulate the states' employ-
ment of public safety officers. It concludes that the Commerce Clause
does not enable such regulation because public safety employment does
not substantially affect interstate commerce and that state sovereignty acts
as an independent bar to the regulation. This Note further concludes
that Congress's "national defense" powers do not enable the regulation of
public safety employment because, under both the current statutory re-
gime of domestic emergency-response efforts and the constitutional anti-
commandeering doctrine, the states' public safety officers are beyond the
reach of federal control. Thus, this Note posits that if the Public Safety
Employer-Employee Cooperation Act is enacted, the Supreme Court
would—and should—strike it down.
INTRODUCTION
On July 17, 2007, the House of Representatives passed House Bill
980, the "Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2007,"
which would require states and their localities to permit public safety
officers (i.e., police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical ser-
vices workers) to unionize and engage in collective bargaining with
their governmental employers.' Senate Bill 2123, House Bill 980's
Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2007, H.R. 980, 110th Cong.
§§ 3-4 (2007). "Collective bargaining" refers to negotiation over employment matters
(e.g., wages, hours, or benefits) between an employer and a representative of all employees
on the employees' behalf (i.e., a union) rather than multiple negotiations between an
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companion, is presently pending in the Senate, and, with thirty-six co-
sponsors, it is poised for passage. 2 If successfully enacted into federal
law, this legislation would wreak a dramatic change in the current fed-
eralist balance of power in state and local labor relations.5 Currently,
governmental employers-at the federal, state, and local levels-are
exempt from the requirements of the National Labor Relations Act
("NLR ►"), which imposes an obligation on private employers, enforced
by the National Labor Relations Board, to participate in collective bar-
gaining with their employees' unions. 4 Congress largely eradicated the
federal government's NLRA exemption, however, with the passage of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which authorizes most civil ser-
vants to unionize and engage in collective bargaining with their agency-
employers. 5 House Bill 980 and Senate Bill 2123 represent the latest in
a similar twelve-year effort by certain members of Congress to eradicate
a portion of state and local governments' NLRA exemption with re-
spect to those governments' public safety employees. 6 Since 1995,
twelve "Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act" ("PSEEC
Act") bills seeking to impose the collective bargaining obligation on
states and their localities have been introduced in either the House or
the Senate.? Only two advanced out of their committees. 8 House Bill
employer and each employee individually. See ROBERT A. GORMAN 8, MATTHEW W. FINKIN,
BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAw § 1,3, at 4-7 (2d ed. 2004).
2 See Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 2007, S. 2123, 110th Cong.
(2007); 154 CONG. Ri:c. 35205 (daily ed. June 5, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. S4487 (daily ed.
May 20, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. 54029 (daily ed. May 12, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. S2232
(daily ed. Mar. 31, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. S1877 (daily ed. Mar. 11, 2008); 154 CONG. REC.
S1202 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2008); 153 CONG. REC. 315,139 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007); 153
CONG. REC. S14,400 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. 513,990 (daily ed. Nov. 6,
2007); 153 CONG. REC. 513,686 (daily ed. Nov. 1, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S13,581 (daily ed.
Oct. 30, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S12,937 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S12,379
(daily ed. Oct. 1, 2007).
3 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566-67 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181-83 (1992); S. 2123 §§ 3-4; H.R. 980 §§ 3-4.
4 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(2), 157 (2000).
5 See Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-454, § 701, 92 Stat. 1111, 1191-
1216 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (2006)). Interestingly, federal law
enforcement officers are not covered by the Civil Service Reform Act and thus have no
right to collective bargaining. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a) (3).
6 SeeH.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 5-9 (2007).
7 See id.; see also S. 2123; - H.R. 980; S. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1299, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 606, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 814, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 952, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 1475, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1016, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1093, 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 1173, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1484, 104th Cong. (1995).
8 See H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 5-9.
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980 is the first of this legislation to be passed by a house of Congress.9
Even if the bill fails to gain approval in the Senate, its advancement cer-
tainly evidenCes the momentum this type of legislation has gained in
the new, Democrat-controlled Congress, and one would certainly ex-
pect the effort to continue.°
Congress passed the NLRA in 1935, invoking its power to "regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States" under
Article I, Section 8, Clause 2—the Commerce Clause—of the Constitu-
tion. 1 I Similarly, and predictably, the drafters of the various PSEEC Act
bills have invoked the Commerce Clause as constitutional authority for
that legislation) 2 Interestingly; however, the Commerce Clause is not
the only source of federal authority invoked in House Bill 980 or Sen-
ate Bill 2123) 3 Indeed, the Commerce Clause authority seems almost
like a secondary consideration, appended near the very end of the
bills' "declaration [s] of purpose: 14
 Beyond the Commerce Clause, the
bills expressly refer to the role of local first-responders in national de-
fense and national emergency response, thus invoking Congress's pow-
ers to legislate matters concerning national defense.° The bills speak of
local police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services work-
ers as agents of the federal government in times of emergency; with du-
ties to protect federal property and to take on federal responsibilities.°
Thus, under its constitutional ability to "make all Laws which shall be
9 See id.; 153 CONG. REC. 117871-72 (daily ed. July 17, 2007).
l° Sec H.R. REP, No. 110-232, at 5-9; see also DEMOCRATIC NAT'L COMM., STRONG Kr
HOME, RESPECTED IN THE. WORLD: THE 2004 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM FOR Ant ER-
WA 24 ( July 27, 2004), available at http://www.dnc.org/pdfs/2004platform.pdf  (stating
that the Democrats' national platform includes "reforming our labor laws to protect the
rights of workers (including public employees) to bargain contracts and organize on a level
playing field without interference" (emphasis added)).
ll See National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449, 449-50 (1935) (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)) ("The denial by employers of the right of employ-
ees to organize and the refusal by employers to accept the procedure of collective bargain-
ing lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ....").
12 See, e.g., H.R. 980 § 2(5) ("The potential absence of adequate cooperation between
public safety employers and employees ... can affect interstate and intrastate com-
merce.").
15 See S. 2123 § 2(4); H.R. 980 § 2(5).
14 SeeS. 2123 § 2(4); H.R. 980 § 2(5).
15 SeeS. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
15 See S. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2). Federal responsibilities certainly include
"avoid [ing] substantial and debilitating interference with interstate and foreign com-
merce" and "protect Ling] the national security of the United States." See U.S. CONST. art. L
§ 8, cls. 1, 3; H.R. 980 § 2(2).
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necessary and proper" to effect federal powers, 17 Congress has asserted
a right to regulate relations between these would-be federal "deputies"
and their actual employers, state and local governments. 18
The PSEEC Act, in its pending form, raises several questions of
constitutional law, including whether Congress may properly impose,
either under the Commerce Clause or under its "national defense" au-
thority, a collective bargaining requirement on states and localities as
employers of police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical ser-
vices workers. 19
 This Note analyzes this constitutional question; deter-
mines that the PSEEC Act has weak constitutional support, and predicts
that the Supreme Court likely would—and should—strike it down. 2°
Part I of this Note examines federal regulation of employment under
the Commerce Clause by reviewing the use of that clause to support
congressional legislation pertaining to private employment, the expan-
sion of the clause to support congressional regulation of public em-
ployment, the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to state sov-
ereignty as a limitation on otherwise valid Commerce Clause juris-
prudence, and the Supreme Court's recent limitation of Commerce
Clause authority generally.21 Part II examines the role of the federal
government in national emergencies by looking at Congress's powers
of "national defense," the current structure under which emergencies
are handled by different levels of government, and the limitations on
Congress's ability to commandeer state and local executive officials to
carry out federal laws. 22 Part 1.11 looks at. the history of the PSEEC Act
and examines the current version in detail, including its purported
sources of authority.23 finally, Part IV examines the constitutional issue
presented by the PSEEC Act's purported sources of authority, including
issues under the Commerce Clause and under federal "national de-
fense" authority, and concludes that neither source is sufficient to en-
able the legislation's enactment. 24
17 See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 18.
18 See id. cls. 1, 8, 18; S. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
18 See infra notes 190-252 and accompanying text.
20 Sce infra notes 190-252 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 25-119 and accompanying text.
22 Sec infra notes 115-152 and accompanying text.
ss Sec infra notes 153-189 and accompanying text.
24 See infra notes 190-252 and accompanying text.
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I. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
LABOR REGULATION UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
Congress successfully regulates, in one form or another, nearly all
private employment and many aspects of public sector employment by
invoking its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce. 25
This Part reviews Congress's ability to impose collective bargaining on
private employers under the Commerce Clause through the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" or the "Act") . 26 It continues by examining
congressional attempts to regulate public sector employment under the
Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court's wavering jurisprudence on
the effect of state sovereignty on such regulation. 27 Finally, this Part ex-
amines the Supreme Court's recent Commerce Clause cases and the
current limits of congressional power under the clause.28
A. Federally Imposed Collective Bargaining on Private Employers Under the
National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA declares the failure of private employers to engage in
collective bargaining with their employees' unions an "unfair labor
practice."29 The Act effectively prohibits all unfair labor practices "af-
fecting commerce" by empowering the National Labor Relations Board
("NLRB") to investigate and prevent such practices and to issue court-
enforceable injunctions against them." Thus, the NLRA imposes col-
lective bargaining on nearly all private employers."
Enacted in 1935, the NLRA was Congress's first successful attempt
at the broad regulation of private employers' labor relations." Prior to
25 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2000).
26 See infra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 50-87 and accompanying text.
28 Sec infra notes 88-114 and accompanying text.
29 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(8) , 158(a) (5) .
50 Id. § 160(a), (c), (e).
31 See id. §§ 152(8), 158(a) (5), 160(a), 160(c), 160(e). Because of the vast number of
private employers relative to its budget, the NLRB has chosen to enforce the NLRA only
against employers whose gross revenues exceed certain minima. See GORMAN
supra note 1, § 3.2, at 27-32.
32 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 49 (1937) (upholding the
constitutional validity of the NLRA). Prior to the passage of the NLRA, Congress had en-
acted, and the Supreme Court upheld, the Railway Labor Act, which created very similar
rights and duties to those of the NLRA but only for railroad employers and employees. See
Railway Labor Act, ch. 347, 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-
188 (2000)); Tex. & N.O.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 570-71 (1930)
(upholding the constitutional validity of the Railway Labor Act). For an overview of Con-
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the Act, the Supreme Court consistently struck down federal legislation
aimed at regulating industrial labor relations." The crux of the Court's
holdings was that local activities having only indirect effects on inter-
state commerce, such as labor relations, could not be reached by Con-
gress under the Commerce Clause." In 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., however, the Court changed course." Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corporation, one of the largest, vertically integrated steel compa-
nies of its era, was charged by the NLRB with discriminating against a
group of unionized employees in violation of the NLRA. 36 Jones &
Laughlin refused to comply with the NLRB's order requiring the rehir-
ing of certain fired employees, so, in accordance with the NLRA, the
Board petitioned the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to en-
force the order. 37 The court refused, holding, largely in accord with
contemporaneous Supreme Court precedent, that the Act exceeded
the scope of the Commerce Clause. 38 On review, however, the Supreme
Court reversed, announcing a new standard for determining the valid-
ity of congressional action under the Commerce Clause: whether the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce." The Act itself purported
to limit its own applicability to labor practices "affecting corm -tierce,"
defined as "burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of
commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burden-
gress's attempts to legislate labor relations prior to the NLRA, see Alum main Cox, LABOR
Law 37-72 (14th ed. 2006).
33 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297-310 (1936) (striking down legislation
of mineworkers' working conditions and collective bargaining rights); A.L.A. Schechter Poul-
try Corp. V. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 542-50 (1935) (striking down congressionally au-
thorized regulations of wages and hours of slaughterhouse workers); R.R. Ret. Bd. v Alton
R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 362-74 (1935) (striking down legislation requiring that railroads fund
government-administered pensions for their employees); Hammer v. Dagenham 247 U.S.
251, 276 (1918) (striking down legislation aimed at curtailing child labor); Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161, 176-80 (1908) (striking down legislation requiring common carriers to
permit their employees to join labor unions); Howard v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. (The Employers'
Liability Cases), 207 U.S. 463, 496-502 (1908) (striking down legislation granting a federal
cause of action to injured employees of common carriers against their employers).
34 See, e.g., Adair, 208 U.S. at 178; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 548, 570-73
(Kennedy, j., concurring) (detailing the Supreme Court's pre-1937 Commerce Clause
jurisprudence).
33 Sec 301 U.S. at 29-32.
3'3 Id. at 22.
37 Id. For the NLRB's original order, see In rejones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 1 N.L.R.B.
503, 517-18 (1936), enforcement denied, 83 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1936), raid, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
33 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 83 F.2d 998, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1936) (per
curiam), rev'd, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
38 See Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 30-32.
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ing or obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce." 40 The Su-
preme Court accepted that legislation "affecting commerce" was within
the bounds of the Commerce Clause and then held that the Act, pur-
porting only to reach labor practices "affecting commerce," was consti-
tutional when applied in such cases.'" The Court then examined the
facts surrounding the charges against Jones & Laughlin and deter-
mined that its actions affected commerce. 42
 The Court first noted that
the company was "organized on a national scale," meaning that any in-
dustrial strife (i.e., strikes or work stoppages) would burden the flow of
interstate commerce:" The Court then simply took judicial notice of
the belief that the refusal to permit employee unionizing and collective
bargaining results in industrial strife." Thus, the Court concluded that
the potential burden on interstate commerce posed 'by the likelihood
of strikes by Jones & Laughlin workers resulting from a lack of collec-
tive bargaining rights was properly within the scope of both the NLRA
and the Commerce Clause. 45
On the same day that the Court announced its decision in Jones
• & Laughlin, it also handed down several companion opinions affirm-
ing the applicability of the NLRA to various other companies, provid-
ing no additional analysis and simply citing Jones & Laughlin. 46
 None
of the companion-case companies was as large as Jones & Laughlin, 47
and one, although buying and selling interstate, had operations pri-
marily only in a single location. 48
 The Court thus silently extended its
Jones & Laughlin holding to include small enterprises engaged only in
interstate buying and selling of goods. 49
4° Id. at 30-31.
" See id. at 31.
4.2
 Id. at 41-42.
43 Id. at 41.
"Jones & Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 42.
45 See id. at 30-32, 41-42.
48 See NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58, 75 (1937); NLRB v.
Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49, 57 (1937). Two additional cases decided on the same
day also affirmed the NLRA but were based on slightly different reasoning than the "af-
fects commerce" standard announced in Jones & Laughlin. Sec Wash,. Va. & Md. Coach Co.
v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142, 146 (1937); Associated Press v NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128-30 (1937).
In Coach, the Court held that the NLRA properly applied to a passenger bus company be-
cause the company was an "instrumentality of interstate commerce." 301 U.S. at 146. In
Associated Press, the Court held that a news wire service, constantly using the 'channels" of
interstate and foreign commerce, was properly subject to the NLRA. 301 U.S. at 128-30.
47
 See Friedman-Harry Marks, 301 U.S. at 72-73; Fruehauf Trailer, 301 U.S. at 53-54; see
also Jones e..9' Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 25-27.
48 See Friedman Harry Marks, 301 U.S. at 72.
49 See id, at 75.
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B. Federal Regulation of State and Local Employe ►-Employee Relations
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Jones & Laughlin, Congress
has enacted a host of legislation regulating private employer-employee
relations." Although Congress has never before attempted to impose
the requirements of the NLRA or collective bargaining on states qua
employers, it has successfully applied to them the requirements of
many of these other federal labor laws. 51 In 1966, for example, Con-
gress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to impose minimum wage
and overtime requirements on state-run hospitals and schools. 52 The
State of Maryland, however, as an operator of schools and hospitals,
challenged the applicability of the federal rules to it as a violation of its
sovereignty." In 1968, in Maryland v. Wirtz, the Supreme Court rejected
the state's argument and stated that the labor relations of hospitals and
schools were properly subject to congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause." The Court held that the mere fact that a state,
rather than a private actor, is involved in an activity otherwise subject to
congressional Commerce Clause regulation does not render the con-
gressional regulation invalid,"
The Supreme Court's holding in Wirtz, however, did not defini-
tively establish Congress's ability to impose labor standards on the states
and, in fact, turned out to be just the beginning of a Supreme Court
back-and-forth on the issue. 56 Following Wirtz, in 1974, Congress again
amended the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time extending its reach to
all state and local employers. 57 Several states and localities challenged
ss See Family & Medical Leave Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, §§ 101-109, 301-404, 107
Stat. 6, 7-19, 23-26 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611-2619, 2631-2654 (West
2000 & Supp. 2008)) (requiring employers to grant employees periods of leave for certain
family reasons); Occupational Safety & Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat.
1590 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-678 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)) (impos-
ing safety standards for workplaces); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, 52 Stat.
1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219 (West 2000 & Supp. 2008)) (impos-
ing minimum wage and overtime pay requirements).
51 Sec Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985); Nat'l
League of Cities V. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 835-37 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528;
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 185-88 (1968), overruled by Nat'l League, 426 U.S. 833,
overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
s2 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-601, § 102(b), 80 Stat.
830, 831; see also Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-219.
53 lifirtz, 392 U.S. at 193.
54 id. at 188-99.
55 See id. at 196-97.
56 See generally Garcia, 469 U.S. 528; Nat'l League, 426 U.S. 833.
57 See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259. § 6, 88 Suit. 55,
58-62 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.A. § 633a (West 1999 & Supp. 2007)).
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this congressional extension of Wirtz; they argued that Congress was no
longer regulating the states indirectly as operators of "commercial en-
terprises" but rather directly, in their capacity as sovereign entities. 58
The states and localities did not argue that public employment was be-
yond the scope of the Commerce Clause, but rather that the constitu-
tional doctrine of Intergovernmental immunity" prevented the direct
imposition of the Fair Labor Standards Act provisions on the states qua
states. 59
In 1976, in National League of Cities v. Usery, the Supreme Court
agreed with this view, expressly overruling Wirtz and affirming that the
Constitution limits the ability of the federal government to override
state sovereignty, citing the Tenth Amendment as a declaration of that
limitation."' The Court further found that an "undoubted attribute of
State sovereignty" is the ability to determine the wages and working
hours of those whom the state engages to carry out its governmental
functions." The Court thus held that the Commerce Clause did not
permit Congress to regulate the employment matters of state govern-
ments "in areas of traditional governmental functions," 62
Following National League, courts were forced to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether particular state employers were engaged in
"traditional governmental functions" and were thus immune from fed-
eral labor regulations. 63 The task proved difficult, and the courts
68 See Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 835-37; see also Fair Labor Standards Amendments of
1974 § 6.
69 Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 837.
60 See id. at 842-43 ("While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a 'tru-
ism,' stating merely that 'all is retained which has not been surrendered,' it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that Congress
may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity or their ability to
function effectively in a federal system." (quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547
n.7 (1975) (citation omitted))); id. at 852; see also U.S. Coss-r. amend. X ("The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
61 Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 845.
62 Id. at 852 ("ElInsofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the
States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions, they are not within the authority granted Congress by Art. I, § 8, cl. 3."); id. at 855.
Whether the holding in National League represented a strict rule or allowed for a "balanc-
ing of interests" in cases where the federal interest would be far greater than the states' is
not clear. See id. at 852-53, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Balancing language does not
appear in the majority opinion, but Justice Blackmun joined in the opinion and gave it a
majority only to the extent that it did endorse a balancing scheme. See id. at 856.
" See, e.g., Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 239
(1983) (determining the applicability of a federal employment discrimination statute to
the Wyoming Game and Fish Department).
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reached seemingly inconsistent and irreconcilable conclusions with
respect to various state activities. 64
 In 1985, in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Authority, the Supreme Court declined the opportunity
to decide whether public transit is a "traditional governmental func-
tion" and instead narrowly overruled National League, just nine years
after it was decided. 65 The outcome in Garcia hinged on the vote of Jus-
tice Blackmun, who had cautiously concurred in National League. 66 Writ-
ing for the majority in Garcia, Blackmun stated that the Court had
come to the realization that the "traditional governmental function"
standard was unworkable insofar as the role of government continues
to evolve, which, therefore, makes it impossible to determine what con-
stitutes a "traditional" role for government. 67
Justice Blackmun effectively went on to strip the Tenth Amend-
ment of its independent role as a preserver of state sovereignty by hold-
ing that "the sovereignty of the States is limited by the Constitution it-
self:68 In other words, the sovereignty retained by the states is only as
great as remains after the federal government exercises its delegated
powers to their full extent. 69 On the facts of Garcia, the Court held that
so long as the Federal Labor Relations Amendments of 1974 were a
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power, the Amendments' effects
on state sovereignty are wholly permissible under the Constitution. 70
Furthermcire, Justice Blackmun found that protection of state sover-
eignty is not a proper job for the courts because the states are afforded
the opportunity to protect their interests through the structure of the
federal government." The states retain indirect influence over the
See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 538-39. Compare Molina-Estrada v. P.R. Highway Auth., 680
F.2d 841, 845-46 (1st Cir. 1982) (road building is a traditional governmental function),
Hybud Equip. Corp. v. City of Akron, 654 F.2d 1187, 1196 (6th Cir. 1981) (waste disposal is
a traditional governmental function), and United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1102-03
(9th Cir. 1978) (issuing drivers' licenses is a traditional governmental function), with Wil-
liams v. Eastside Mental Health Cm, Inc., 669 F.2d 671, 680-81 (11th Cir. 1982) (providing
mental health services is not a traditional governmental function), Pub. Serv. Co. of N.C. v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Cornm'n, 587 F.2d 716, 721 (5th Cir. 1979) (sale of natural gas is
not a traditional governmental function), and P.R. Tel. Co. v, Fed. Commc'n Comm'n, 553
F.2d 694, 700-01 (1st Cir. 1977) (operation of a telephone company is not a traditional
governmental function).
65 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530-31.
66 See Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 556.
67 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 539-47.
68 See id. at 548.
69 See id. at 548-50.
79 See id.
71
 See id. at 550-54.
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composition of the House of Representatives and the election of the
President insofar as the states control electoral qualifications, and the
states, until ratification of the Seventeenth Amendment in 1913, had
direct control over the composition of the Senate. 72
 Thus, Justice
Blackmun concluded that "the political position of the States in the
federal system has served to minimize the burdens that the States bear
under the Commerce Clause." 73
The 5-4 Garcia decision was announced over vociferous dissent. 74
Justice Rehnquist, in one of three dissenting opinions, asserted confi-
dently that the National League conception of state sovereignty and its
limitation on congressional power would "in time again command the
support of a majority of this Court." 75
 To a large degree, Justice
Rehnquist's prediction has come true, albeit indirectly. 76 In 1992, in
New Knit v. United States, the Court revived state sovereignty as a limita-
tion on Congress's exercise of its Commerce Clause powers. 77 In that
case, the Court was confronted with a federal statute attempting to deal
with the interstate disposal of radioactive waste by requiring states ei-
ther to enact specific legislation regulating the waste or to take title to
the waste from the in-state hospitals that were producing it. 78
 The Court
recognized the authority of Congress to regulate the interstate market
in waste disposal under the Commerce Clause but held that state sover-
eignty is an inherent limitation on the Commerce Clause, preventing
Congress from directing state legislatures to enact federally prescribed
legislation.79
 Essentially, the Court held that whatever Congress can
regulate under the Commerce Clause it must regulate directly. 8°
Without expressly affirming or disapproving of any prior cases, the
Court stated in New Knit that it was not revisiting any of its decisions
pertaining to Congress's ability to subject states to generally applicable
72 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551.
75 Id. at 553-54. Implicit in this rejection of state sovereignty as a bar to congressional
action is a repudiation of the '`balancing of interests" approach articulated by Justice
Blackmun in his Garcia concurrence. See id. at 556-57; Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 856
(Blackmun, J., concurring).
74 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 557-79 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 579-80 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting); id. at 580-89 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
75 Id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78 Sec Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,932 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144,177-78,181-83 (1992).
" See New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78,181-83.
75 Id. at 149-54,
79 Id. at 159-66.
Sce id. at 166.
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federal laws, citing, among other cases, Garcia. 81 The Court proceeded,
however, to undermine Garcia in two important respects. 82 First, it re-
fused to recognize as settled the issue of the states' subjection to gener-
ally applicable federal laws—the primary issue in Garcia—and recog-
nized that a weighing of relative interests may be required.85 Second, in
response to an argument that the State of New York should be barred
from challenging the waste disposal legislation because its own officials
had supported the legislation in Congress, the Court held that congres-
sional authority cannot be expanded beyond its constitutional limits
simply because the affected entity consents to the expansion. 84 The
Court stated that federalism exists for the protection of individuals, not
for states in and of themselves or their officials, and thus asserted its
duty to protect states from unconstitutional federal encroachment. 85
This pronouncement essentially abrogated one of the analytical pillars
supporting justice Blackmun's holding in Garcia—that the states' posi-
tion in the constitutional structure and their participation in the politi-
cal process negate any need for the courts to protect encroachments on
their sovereignty. 86 The Court's treatment of Garcia in New Vol* repre-
sents a clear limitation on that case's holding and even calls into ques-
tion the case's continued viability generally. 87
C. The Post-Garcia Limitations on the Commerce Clause Power
Despite the seemingly severe limitations placed on the Supreme
Court's holding in Garcia, the Court has not yet expressly overruled the
case; therefore, it presumably remains good law insofar as it allows
BI
 Id. at 160.
Sce New YO7*, 505 U.S. at 177-78,182-83.
Sce id. at 177-78 (citing both National League and Garcia but not reaching the ques-
tion of "whether or not a particularly strong federal interest enables Congress to bring
state governments within the orbit of generally applicable federal regulation ...."). Five
years later, in Prink the Supreme Court again stated that the question remains open and
again cited both National League and Garcia. See Prink 521 U.S. at 932.
54 New York, 505 U.S. at 182.
55 See id. at 181-83.
e5 See id.; see also Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550-54 (presenting the "structural" argument
against court protection of state sovereignty). In an almost direct affront to Garcia, the
Court supported its holding by citing a footnote from National League that dismissed a
similar "structural" argument made by Justice Brennan in his dissent from that case. See
New loth, 505 U.S. at 182 (citing Nat? League, 426 U.S. at 841 n.12). The Court did not
mention or cite Garcia directly. Sce id.
a7 See New York, 505 U.S. at 177-78, 182-83; see also Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. &
State Univ., 169 F.3d 820,860-61 (4th Cir. 1999) (en bane) (recognizing the invalidity of
Garcia's "structural" analysis), affd sub non. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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Congress to subject the states as employers to generally applicable fed-
eral labor laws under the Commerce Clause.88 But even if Garcia re-
mains intact, an open question remains as to whether state employ-
ment—particularly the employment of public safety officers—is subject
to the Commerce Clause. 89 In both National League and Garcia, the state
challengers did not raise the issue, ceding state employment regulation
as within the scope of the Commerce Clause." In 1976 and 1985, this
was undoubtedly a good strategy on the part of the challenger-states, as
the Commerce Clause had been read by the Supreme Court to permit
congressional regulation of virtually any activity for which a link to in-
terstate commerce could be articulated. 91
The Supreme Court, however, ended its laissez faire deference to
congressional determinations of Commerce Clause authority in 1995 in
United States v. Lopez—the first case in nearly eighty years in which the
Court struck down a federal statute as beyond the scope of the Com-
merce Clause.92 At issue in the case was a provision of the Gun-Free
School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to possess a
firearm within 1000 feet of a school (the "possession provision"). 99 A
high school student charged with violating the possession provision
challenged it as beyond the scope of Congress's powers, but the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Texas found the statute to be a
valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power. 94 On appeal, however,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit agreed with the student
and struck down the provision.95 In a landmark opinion, the Supreme
Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals. 96
The Supreme Court enumerated three purposes for which the
Commerce Clause permits Congress to act: (1) to regulate the use of
88 See Garda, 469 U.S. at 554 ("[The San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority] faces
nothing more than the same minimum-wage and overtime obligations that hundreds of
thousands of other employers, public as well as private, have to meet.").
99 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-13; United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-60
(1995); Garcia, 469 U.S. at 575 (Powell, J., dissenting).
90 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 537; Nat'l League, 426 U.S. at 837.
81 See, e.g., Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 194-95 (stating in dicta that schools and hospitals are "ma-
jor users of goods imported from other states" and, therefore, congressional regulation of
school and hospital employment is permitted because strikes or work stoppages would
interrupt the flow of the imported goods).
92 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
Id. at 551; see also 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2) (A) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (the possession
provision), invalidated by Lopez, 519 U.S. 549.
to Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52.
9° Id. at 552.
9° Id.
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the channels of interstate commerce; (2) to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce (i.e., people or things in in-
terstate commerce); and (3) to regulate activities that "substantially
affect" interstate commerce. 97 The Court noted that the legislative
history of the possession provision lacked any findings by Congress as
to the relationship between interstate commerce and gun possession
near schools, thus denying the Court the ability to evaluate any con-
nection not readily apparent but understood by Congress. 98 The gov-
ernment, nevertheless, argued that the possession provision was valid
under the third category of Commerce Clause authority. 99 It asserted
that guns near schools might (1) result in violent crime, which would
result in the expenditure of insurance money, which would be spread
across the country; (2) result in violent crime, which would reduce
the willingness of people to travel; or (3) handicap the educational
process, which would result in a less productive citizenry, which would
eventually adversely affect the national economy.'" The Court refused
to "pile inference upon inference" in order to establish the connec-
6°11. 1 °1 Instead, it held simply that gun possession is "in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially
affect any sort of in terstate commerce. "1 02
Five years later, in United Slates v. Morrison, the Court affirmed Lopez
in full when it struck down a provision of the Violence Against Women
Act of 1994, which created a federal cause of action for victims of gen-
der-motivated violence against their attackers (the "civil remedy provi-
sion"), as beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause authority.'" At is-
sue in Morrison was whether the civil remedy provision regulated an
activity "substantially affecting" interstate commerce and was thus a valid
exercise of the Commerce Clause power.'" Unlike the statute in ques-
tion in Lopez, the legislative history of the civil remedy provision con-
tained several congressional "findings" as to the effects of gender-
97 Id. at 558-59.
98 Id. at 562-63.
9° Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
ma Id.
101 Id. at 567.
102 Id. (emphasis added).
108
	 529 U.S. at 605-06, 611, 618; see also 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994) (the civil
remedy provision), invalidated by Morrison 529 U.S. 598.
104 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09. Also at issue in Morrison was an alternative argument
that the civil remedy provision was valid as an exercise of Congress's remedial power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 619. The Court held that it was not. Id. at
625-27.
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motivated violence on interstate commerce: gender-motivated violence
deters victims from interstate travel, employment in interstate business,
and interstate business transactions; diminishes national productivity;
increases medical costs; and decreases the supply of and demand for
"interstate products." Despite Congress's efforts, the Supreme Court
asserted the duty to review the strength of the legislative findings. 106 The
Court confirmed its Lopez holding, that for an activity to "substantially
affect" interstate commerce it at least must be "some sort of economic
endeavor," and determined that gender-motivated violence does not
qualify. 1 °7 The Court held that the reasoning behind the legislative find-
ings (i.e., that the non-economic regulated activity eventually affects in-
terstate commercial activity at some point along an attenuated causal
chain) cannot be permitted because it could allow Congress to regulate
virtually any activity, even areas of "traditional state regulation." 108
In 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich, the most recent Supreme Court case
addressing the scope of congressional Commerce Clause power, the
Court upheld the applicability of a federal statute prohibiting drug
possession to a cancer patient who grew marijuana at her home solely
for personal, medicinal tise. 109 The Court did not alter its decisions in
Lopez or Morrison to reach its conclusion but affirmed a longstanding
holding that Congress may regulate local economic activities that are
part of a "class of activities" substantially affecting interstate com-
merce. 110 This, the Court held, allows Congress to regulate the local
"production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which
there is an ... interstate market." 111
The Commerce Clause, as interpreted today; thus permits congres-
sional regulation of the channels and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce and of activities substantially affecting interstate commerce. 112
To substantially affect interstate commerce, an activity must be eco-
nomic and must either have a direct, nonattenuated impact on inter-
1 °5 Id. at 614-15 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 103-711, at 385 (1994) (Conf. Rep.), as re-
printed in . 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1801, 1853).
106 Id.
107 See id. at 611 (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60); id. at 613.
108 See id. at 615-16. The Court's concern for protecting from federal intrusion ''areas
of traditional state regulation," see id., further calls into doubt the continued force of Gar-
cia, which declared as unworkable judicial inquiries into "traditional governmental func-
tions," see Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
122 See 545 U.S. 1,6-7,17 (2005).
100 See id. at 17 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 145,151 (1971) & Wickard v.
Wilburn, 317 U.S. 111,128-29 (1942)); id. at 23-25.
111 See id. at 25-26.
112 See id. at 16-17; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
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state commerce or must be part of a "class of activities" having such an
impact (i.e., involve commodities with interstate markets)." 3 The courts
will not simply defer to congressional findings of Commerce Clause ap-
plicability and will determine for themselves whether an activity qualifies
for federal regulation under the Clause.'"
11. CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY AND LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO
NATIONAL EMERGENCIES AND LOCAL FIRST-RESPONDERS
Congressional authority derives from many constitutional sources in
addition to the Commerce Clause. 115 This Part examines the sources of
authority for Congress's ability to legislate concerning domestic-front
national emergencies." 6 It then reviews the ways in which Congress actu-
ally exercises its authority.'" Finally, this Part examines the restraints on
congressional power over states (including the power to legislate con-
cerning national emergencies) imposed by the anti-commandeering
doc trin e.
A. The Federal Role in National Emergencies
The federal government's powers in the area of foreign affairs
are unquestioned and, unlike other federal powers, are generally re-
garded as plenary. 119 Although issues involving these plenary foreign
affairs powers have been rarely litigated, some courts have inferred
from this authority a somewhat broader "national defense" power that
authorizes some forms of domestic congressional activity. 120 The limits
118 See Raid!, 545 U.S. at 17, 23-25; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 611, 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at
567.
114
 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15.
115 See, e.g., U.S. CoNs•r. art I, § 8, cls. 1-2, 4-18.
116 See infra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
118 See infra notes 137-152 and accompanying text.
119 See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1936)
("The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers except those
specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are necessary anti
proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect of
our internal affairs."); see also Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 417-20 (2003)
(invalidating a state insurance law because of a perceived conflict with federal foreign pol-
icy); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432, 440 (1968) (invalidating a state inheritance law
because it was an impermissible "intrusion" into the field of foreign affairs insofar as it
required the state's officials to inquire into the internal policies of foreign countries).
120 See, e.g., United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F. Supp. 255, 261-62 (D.D.C. 1951)
(recognizing a "national defense" power and upholding under it a federal statute aimed at
"propaganda carried on in this country by foreign agents"); cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
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of this power have not been well-defined, but the Supreme Court has
held that, at the very least, it cannot be used to infringe constitutional
rights without a careful case-by-case balancing by the courts."' With
regard to issues of federalism, specifically whether Congress could
invoke "national defense" as authority to direct the states' responses
to national emergencies, the extent of congressional authority is not
at all clear because, thus far, such an attempt has not been made." 2
Instead, Congress has largely relied on its spending power to gain
federal influence over national emergencies, which include natural
disasters (e.g., floods), large-scale accidents (e.g., hazardous chemical
spills), and terrorist attacks.'" The Spending Clause of the Constitu-
tion permits Congress to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and
Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and
general Welfare of the United States ...." 124 The Supreme Court has
interpreted this grant of power broadly: Congress, essentially, may
spend federal money as it sees fit.' 25 Included in this power is the abil-
ity to condition monetary grants to the states; in other words, Con-
gress may exact state action that it could not otherwise impose,
Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (suggesting that Congress, but not the
President, could effect the seizure of private industrial concerns in order to quell labor
disputes because of the importance of industry to national defense efforts).
121 See United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967).
122 Cf. id. In Robel, the Court stated that the
concept of "national defense" cannot be deemed an end in itself, justifying
any exercise of legislative power designed to promote such a goal. Implicit in
the term "national defense" is the notion of defending those values and ideals
which set this Nation apart.... It would indeed be ironic if, in the name of
national defense, we would sanction the subversion of one of those liberties
... which nukes the defense of the Nation worthwhile.
Id. One may wonder whether .the Court would include the vertical separation of powers
among the liberties making the defense of the nation worthwhile. See id.; cf. New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[F]ederalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power." (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 759 (1991) (Blacluriund., dissenting))).
125 See, e.g., Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207 (West 2000 & Stipp. 2008). Congress's spending authority is
granted in the Spending Clause of the Constitution, the first of Congress's enumerated
powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1.
124 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
125 See Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004) ("Congress has authority under
the Spending Clause to appropriate federal moneys to promote the general welfare ....");
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) ("M he power of Congress to authorize ex-
penditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legis-
lative power found in the Constitution."); see also ERWIN CIIEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 3.4.1, at 273-75, § 3.4.3, at 278-81 (3d ed. 2006).
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through the promise of money. 126 So, to assert a federal role in emer-
gencies, Congress uses this power and conditions federal grants and
assistance on the states' acceptance of federal policies.'"
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act, the principal federal legislation pertaining to national emergen-
cies, is a prime example of an exercise of the congressional spending
power. 128 The Act gives federal agencies a secondary role in emergen-
cies, leaving state and local officials as first responders. 129 Congress
has been careful to respect the states' autonomy in responding to
emergencies occurring within their borders, authorizing the federal
government to provide post-disaster assistance—either in the form of
money or manpower—only upon request by governors. 1 " States thus
have the choice of whether to request and accept federal emergency
assistance and to comply with any federal mandates attached to 4. 131
Closely related to responding to emergencies is preparing for
them, and Congress has mostly taken the same states-first approach in
its preparedness efforts. 132 The federal government makes prepared-
126 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1987) (affirming Congress's ability
to require states to enact a minimum drinking age in exchange for federal highway
money); Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil Serv. C.onun'n, 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947) (affirming
Congress's ability to impose requirements for state employment in exchange for federal
funds); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 125, § 3.4.3, at 279-81. Congress's power to con-
dition grants is not absolute; the condition must be explicit, so that states accept it know-
ingly, and it must bear some relation to the federal interest being advanced. See Dole, 483
U.S. at 207-08.
127 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207.
128 see id.
129 See id. § 5121(b) ("It is the intent of Congress ... to provide an orderly and con-
tinuing means of assistance by the Federal Government to State and local governments in
carrying out their responsibilities to alleviate the suffering and damage which result from
such disasters ...." (emphasis added)).
13° See id. § 5170 (authorizing the President to declare a "major disaster" only upon re-
quest by the state governor); id. § 5170b(c) (authorizing the President to allow the use of
Department of Defense resources upon request by the state governor); id. § 5191(a) (au-
thorizing the President to declare an "emergency" only upon request by the state gover-
nor). But see id. § 5191(b) (authorizing the President to declare an "emergency" inde-
pendently in cases involving "a subject area for which, under the Constitution or laws of
the United States, the United States exercises exclusive or preeminent responsibility and
authority" but still requiring that the President "consult the Governor of any affected
State, if practicable").
131 See rd. §§ 5170, 5170b(c), 5191(a); see also City of San Bruno v. FEMA, 181 F.
Stipp. 2d 1010, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2001) ("After a disaster has been declared [pursuant to 42
U.S.C.A. § 5170], the affected stare and FEMA enter into an agreement under which the
state is the initial 'grantee' and is responsible for dispersing funds pursuant to the agree-
ment with FEMA."),
122 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5131-5134.
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ness funds and training programs available only to states that desire
them and that are willing to satisfy federally prescribed requirements
attached to them.'" An ambitious example of federal preparedness
efforts includes the National Incident Management System ("NIMS"),
implemented originally in 2004 by the Department of Homeland Se-
curity and recently revised and reimplemented in August 2007. 134
NIMS is not a specific emergency response plan; it is essentially a
framework, which, if adopted universally, would harmonize, and dins
facilitate, emergency response methods across jurisdictions. 133 The
presidential directive ordering the creation of NIMS also requires all
federal departments and agencies to adopt the program and, to
achieve widespread adoption by state and local first responders (e.g.,
police, firefighters, and emergency medical services workers), makes
NIMS adoption a condition of the states' and localities' receipt of
federal preparedness assistance.' 36
B. Restraints on Federal Power Imposed by the Anti-Commandeering Doctrine
A general limitation on congressional authority over the states,
and one with particular importance to domestic national defense and
federal emergency response efforts, is the anti-commandeering doc-
trine, which prevents the federal government from asserting direct
control over state governments and state officials.'" The Supreme
Court first articulated the modern anti-commandeering doctrine in
1992 in New York v. United States.' 38
 The Court, finding that the Tenth
Amendment is an affirmation of state sovereignty, held that Congress
cannot constitutionally violate the states' sovereignty by compelling
their legislatures to enact prescribed legislation. 139
133 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2201-2228 (West 2000 & Supp. V 2005); 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5131-
5134.
134
 See generally Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5—Management of
Domestic Incidents, 1 PUB. PAPERS 229 (Feb. 28, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-51; U.S. DEPT.
OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL INCIDENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM (Draft Aug. 2007) [here-
inafter NIMS], available at http://www.fetna.gov/emergency/itims/nitris_doc.shun
 (follow
"Draft Revised NIMS—August 2007" hyperlink; then follow "View / Download / Print"
hyperlink).
135 See NIMS, supra note 134, at 3.
' 36 HSPD-5, supra note 134, at 233.
' 37 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); New Ku*, 505 U.S. at 188.
138 See 505 U.S. at 166; see also supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
138 See New York, 505 U.S. at 166; see also U.S. CoNs•r. amend. X ("The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people.").
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In 1997, in Printz v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed its
holding in New York and extended it to Congress's ability to direct state
executive officials to carry out federal law by striking down a provision of
gun control legislation as violating the anti-commandeering doc trine.' 4°
In 1993, Congress enacted the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act, which required the establishment of a background check system
for handgun purchasers."' The Act contained several interim provi-
sions regulating gun sales during the period that the background check
database was being developed. 142 Among these provisions was a re-
quirement that gun sellers provide local law enforcement with informa-
tion on prospective purchasers and that the law enforcement officers
"make reasonable efforts" within five days to determine whether gun
sales to those individuals would be lawful."3 Two law enforcement offi-
cers challenged the interim provision by objecting to being "pressed"
into federal service and arguing that federal legislation compelling
state officers to execute federal laws is unconstitutional.'" The Su-
preme Court agreed with them."5 Noting that the text of the Constitu-
tion does not expressly answer the question of the federal govern-
ment's ability to have local officials execute its laws, the Court turned to
three alternative sources: historical practice, the structural elements of
the Constitution, and precedent." 6
First, the Court determined that, historically, the federal gov-
ernment had never imposed obligations on state executive officials. 147
Second, the Court examined the structure of the Constitution and
found (1) that the protections afforded by "dual sovereignty" would
be severely undermined if one sovereign. could impress the officials of
the other into its service 148 and (2) that the delegation by Congress of
executive (i.e., law enforcing) activities to entities and individuals out-
side of the control of the President runs afoul of Article II of the Con-
stitution. 149 Finally, the Court looked to its precedent, particularly New
140 Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
141 Id. at 902; see also Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 103-159,
§ 103,107 Stat. 1536,1591-43 (1993).
142 Printz, 521 U.S. at 902-03.
143 Id. at 903.
144 Id. at 904-05.
143 See id. at 935.
146 Id. at 905.
197 See Prink, 521 U.S. at 905-18.
143 See id. at 918-22.
149 See id. at 922-25; sec also U.S. CONST. art II, sec. 1 ("The executive Power shall be
vested in a President of the United States of America.").
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YoA, and affirmed that "[t]he Federal Government may not compel
the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program." 15°
The Court summarized its anti-commandeering doctrine suc-
cinctly and unequivocally:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we
hold that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by
conscripting the States' officers directly. The Federal Gov-
ernment may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States' offi-
cers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or
enforce a federal regulatory program. It matters not whether
policymaking is involved, and no case-by-case weighing of the
burdens or benefits is necessary; such commands are funda-
mentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty."'
The anti-commandeering doctrine thus serves as a clear limit to federal
authority and suggests one reason why Congress has not altered its
Spending Clause approach to effecting local policies regarding na-
tional emergency responses.I 52
III. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY AND PROVISIONS OF THE PENDING
PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE COOPERATION ACT
Beginning with the 104th Congress in 1995, Michigan Representa-
tive Dale E. Kildee has introduced a version of the Public Safety Em-
ployer-Employee Cooperation Act ("PSEEC Act" or the "Act") in the
House of Representatives in each Congress (i.e., every second year),
including the current one, the 110th.I 53
 Beginning with the 106th
Congress in 1999, companion legislation has consistently been intro-
duced in the Senate.I 54
 The goal of the legislation has remained un-
changed: to require states and their localities to engage in collective
bargaining with the unions representing the public safety officers (i.e.,
1543
 Printz. 521 U.S. at 933 (quoting Nero York, 505 U.S. at 188).
151 Id. at 935.
152
 See id.; supra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
155 See H.R. 980, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1249, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 814, 108th
Cong. (2003); H.R. 1475, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R. 1093, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 1173,
105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 1484, 104th Cong. (1995).
154 See S. 2123, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 513, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 606, 108th Cong.
(2003); S. 952, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1016, 106th Cong. (1999).
1196	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1175
police officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services workers)
whom they employ. 166 In the words of the legislation's supporters, it is
designed to extend the collective bargaining right to "the only sizeable
group of workers" lacking it. 166 This Part briefly traces the legislative
history, to date, of the PSEEC Act, and examines its purported sources
of authority: the Commerce Clause and congressional "national de-
fense" power.'"
The first two PSEEC Act bills, introduced by Representative Kildee
in 1995 and 1997, failed to advance out of the House subcommittees to
which they were referred. 158 In 1999, both a House and a Senate ver-
sion of a PSEEC Act bill were introduced, and, although neither ad-
vanced out of its committee, both were given committee hearings. 169
The House and Senate bills introduced in 2001, 2003, and 2005 either
failed to advance out of their respective committees or subcommittees
or failed to receive a vote in the full house in which they were intro-
duced. 16° In February 2007, Representative Kildee introduced the
PSEEC Act again as House Bill 980, which advanced out of its subcom-
mittee and committee after two hearings and was passed by the House
of Representatives by a vote of 314 to 97 on July 17, 2007. 161 In October
2007, a companion PSEEC Act bill—Senate Bill 2123—was introduced
in the Senate and is currently awaiting a committee hearing. 162 It has
thirty-six co-sponsors. 163
155 See S. 2123 § 4 (2007); H.R. 980 § 4 (2007); S. 513 § 4 (2005); H.R. 1249 § 4 (2005);
S. 606 § 4 (2003); H.R. 814 § 4 (2003); S. 952 § 4 (2001); H.R. 1475 § 4 (2001); S. 1016 § 4
(1999); H.R. 1093 § 4 (1999); H.R. 1173 § 4 (1997); H.R. 1484 § 4(a) (1995).
156 See 147 CONG. REC. E545 (daily ed. Apr. 5, 2001) (statement of Rep. Kildee).
157 See infra notes 158-189 and accompanying text.
158 See H.R. 1173 (1997); H.R. 1484 (1995); H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 5-6 (2007).
159 See S. 1016 (1999); H.R. 1093 (1999); H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 6-7. See generally
Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 1999: Hearing on 5.1016 Before the S. Comm.
on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter 2000 Senate Hearing];
Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 1093 Before the Sub-
comm. on Employer-Employee Relations of the H. Comm. on Educ. and the Workforce, 106th Cong.
(2000) (hereinafter 2000 House Hearing).
161 See H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 7-8; see also S. 513 (2005) (died in committee); H.R.
1249 (2005) (died in subcommittee); S. 606 (2003) (advanced out of committee but died
awaiting vote by the full Senate); H.R. 814 (2003) (died in subconunittee); S. 952 (2001)
(advanced out of committee but died awaiting vote by the full Senate); H.R. 1475 (2001)
(died in subcommittee).
161 See H.R. 980 (2007); H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 8-9 (2007); 153 CONG. REC. H7871-
72 (daily ed. July 17, 2007).
162 See S. 2123 (2007).
168 Sec 154 CONG, REC, 54487 (daily ed. May 20, 2008); 154 CoNG. Rec. 54029 (daily ed.
May 12, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. 52232 (daily ed. Mar. 31, 2008); 154 CONG. REC. 51877
(daily ed. Mar. 11, 2008); 154 CONG, REC, 51202 (daily ed. Feb. 26, 2008); 153 CONG. REC.
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In its current pending form, the PSEEC Act would require the
Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA" or the "Authority"), which
currently administers the collective bargaining laws pertaining to fed-
eral employees, to survey the laws of the states to determine whether
they expressly provide for certain "rights and responsibilities": (a) the
right of public safety officers to unionize; (b) the requirement that
the states and their localities bargain collectively with public safety
unions over hours, wages, and conditions of employment; and (c) the
ability to enforce collective bargaining agreements in state courts.'"
The Act would then require the FLRA to promulgate regulations cre-
ating the prescribed "rights and responsibilities" for states whose laws
fail to provide for them. 165
 The FLRA would then enforce its regula-
tions in those states by supervising and certifying union elections, in-
vestigating violations, conducting hearings of complaints, and issuing
orders to state and municipal employers, enforcement of which the
Authority could seek in the federal courts of appeals. 166
As with all federal legislation, Congress can constitutionally enact
the PSEEC Act only pursuant to one of its constitutionally enumer-
ated powers. 167
 Which power enables enactment of the PSEEC Act has
not always been made clear by the drafters of its various versions.t 68
The first two PSEEC Act bills, introduced in 1995 and 1997, lacked
any invocation of a constitutionally enumerated power, asserting sim-
ply that the Act served the "health and safety of the Nation and the
best interest of public safety employers and employees. "169
Beginning with the third iteration of the Act in 1999, however,
the drafters added language invoking Congress's Commerce Clause
power:
S15,139 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 2007); 153 Corw. REc. S14,400 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2007); 153
Cow:. Rr.c. S13,990 (daily ed. No 6, 2007); 153 CONG, REC. 513,686 (daily ed. Nov. 1,
2007); 153 CONG. RF.c. S13,581 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S12,937 (daily
ed. Oct. 16, 2007); 153 CONG. REC. S12,379 (daily ed. Oct. 1. 2007).
164 See S. 2123 § 4 (a) (1), (b); H.R. 980 § 4(a) (1), (b) (2007).
'65
 S. 2123 § 5(a) (2007); H.R. 980 § 5(a) (2007).
166 S. 2123 § 5(b)—(c) (2007); H.R. 980 § 5(b)—(c) (2007).
167
 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) ("Every law enacted by
Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the Constitution.
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be
mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.'" (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S.
(1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803))).
166 See S. 2123 § 2 (2007); H.R. 980 § 2 (2007); S. 513 § 2 (2005); H.R. 1249 § 2 (2005);
S. 606 § 2 (2003); H.R. 814 § 2 (2003); S. 952 § 2 (2001); H.R. 1475 § 2 (2001); S. 1016 § 2
(1999); H.R. 1093 § 2 (1999); H.R. 1173 § 2 (1997); H.R. 1484 § 2 (1995).
166 See H.R. 1173 § 2(2) (1997); H.R. 1484 § 2(2) (1995).
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The absence of adequate cooperation between public safety
employers and employees has implications for the security of
employees and can affect interstate and intrastate commerce. Addi-
tionally, the lack of such labor-management cooperation det-
rimentally impacts the upgrading of police and fire services of
local communities, the health and well-being of public safety
officers, and the morale of the fire and police departments.
These factors could have significant commercial repercussions.
Moreover, providing minimal standards for collective bargain-
ing negotiations in the public safety industry will prevent in-
dustrial strife between labor and management that interferes
with the normal flow of commerce)"
Both a House subcommittee and a Senate committee held hearings on
this version of the PSEEC Act. 17' In neither hearing was there discus-
sion of this language or of the effects of the lack of collective bargain-
ing between public safety officers and their employers oti interstate
commerce. 172 This commerce-invoking language remained unchanged
in the PSEEC Act bills introduced in 2001,2003, and 2005. 173
In House Bill 980 and Senate Bill 2123, the current pending ver-
sions of the PSEEC Act, the drafters have included similar commerce-
invoking language and added additional language invoking a different
congressional power—national defense.' 74 The new language in House
Bill 980 reads:
17° H.R. 1093 § 2(4) (1999) (emphasis added); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3
("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."). The Senate version of the PSEEC
Act in 1999 also invoked the Commerce Clause but much more cursorily than the House
version. See S. 1016 § 2(2) (1999) ("[TJo maintain the normal flow of commerce the pub-
lic safety industry requires minimal standards for collective bargaining.").
171 See generally 2000 Senate Hearing, supra note 159; 2000 House Hearing, supra note 159.
172 See generally 2000 Senate Hearing, supra note 159; 2000 House Hearing, supra note 159.
173 See S. 513 § 2(3) (2005); H.R. 1249 § 2(4) (2005); S. 600 § 2(3) (2003); H.R. 814
§ 2(4) (2003); S. 952 § 2(3) (2001); H.R. 1475 § 2(4) (2001).
174 See S. 2123 § 2(2), (4) (2007); H.R. 980 § 2(2), (5) (2007). House Bill 980's com-
merce-invoking language has been largely abbreviated:
The potential absence of adequate cooperation between public safety em-
ployers and employees has implications for the security of employees, impacts
the upgrading of police and fire services of local communities, the health and
well-being of public safety officers, and the morale of the fire and police de-
partments, and can affect interstate and intrastate commeire.
HA, 980 § 2(5) (2007) (emphasis added). The language in Senate Bill 2123 remains the
same as in the prior versions of the PSEEC Act. See S. 2123 § 2(4).
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State and local public safety officers play an essential role in
the efforts of the United States to detect, prevent, and re-
spond to terrorist attacks, and to respond to natural disasters,
hazardous materials, and other mass casualty incidents. As the
first to arrive on scene, State and local public safety officers
must be prepared to protect life and property and to preserve
scarce and vital Federal resources, avoid substantial and de-
bilitating interference with interstate and foreign commerce,
and to protect the national security of the United States. Pub-
lic safety employer-employee cooperation is essential in meet-
ing these needs and is, therefore, in the National interestm
The language in Senate Bill 2123 differs only slightly:
State and local public safety officers play an essential role in
the efforts of the United States to detect, prevent, and re-
spond to terrorist attacks, and to respond to natural disasters,
hazardous materials, and other mass casualty incidents. State
and local public safety officers, as first responders, are a com-
ponent of our Nation's National Incident Management Sys-
tem, developed by the Department of Homeland Security to
coordinate response to and recovery from terrorism, major
natural disasters, and other major emergencies. Public safety
employer-employee cooperation is essential in meeting these
needs and is, therefore, in the National interest. 176
The Subcommittee on Health, Employment, Labor, and Pensions
of the House Committee on Education and Labor held hearings on
House Bill 980 in June 2007 in which constitutional issues were dis-
cussed. 177
 The Commerce Clause received little attention during the
actual hearing but was addressed briefly in the written testimony of a
Syracuse University law professor, who posited that the Supreme Court
has permitted Congress to regulate labor relations under the Com-
merce Clause since 1937 and that Congress can regulate local activities
"on the theory that the aggregate number of such local incidents might
"5
 H.R. 980 § 2(2) (2007).
"a S. 2123 § 2(2) (2007).
"7
 See generally Rep. Robert E. Andrews Holds a Hearing on First Responder Collective Bargain-
ing Rights [Before the Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor e.9,
 Pensions of the H. Educ. &'
Labor Comm.], 110th Cong. (June 5, 2007) [hereinafter 2007 House Hearing], available at
LEXIS, CQ Transcriptions database (official transcript not yet available). Unofficial copies
of written testimony, as well as video of the hearing itself, are available at http://edwork
force.house.gov/hearings/help060507.sHml
 (last visited February 29, 2008).
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affect interstate commerce." 17H The Committee Report on House Bill
980, in its portion on the Commerce Clause, borrowed largely from
that written testimony and stated:
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that Congress has
considerable discretion to determine what activities affect in-
terstate commerce, to the extent that it held events of purely
local commerce ... might, because of market forces, nega-
tively affect interstate commerce, and thus could be regulated.
The economic impact of terrorism and natural disasters is
not limited to the locality where these events occur. Rather,
such events have regional and national economic impacts for
which the federal government must be responsive. In addition
to the devastating loss of life of September 11th, the City of
New York estimates that the economic costs from the attacks is
somewhere between $83 billion and $95 billion.... Further-
more, it is estimated that that [sic] the economic loss from
Hurricane Katrina and subsequent flooding in New Orleans is
expected to exceed $100 billion. By improving the cohesive-
ness and effectiveness of public safety employers and their
employees, H.R. 980 assists in stemming these costs.'"
The Report goes on to address the issue of whether Congress can
regulate slates under the Commerce Clause:
Congress' [s] authority to provide collective bargaining
rights to public safety employees is an extension of the Court's
1995 [sic] decision in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan
Transit Authority. The Court in Garcia determined that Con-
gress had the authority to extend wage and hour protections
to state and local workers. If Congress determined that wage
and hour protections should be extended to public sector
workers, the Court reasoned that Representatives from those
districts followed their constituents' policy preferences. Addi-
tionally, ensuring individual liberty would be advanced by
permitting Congress to extent [sic] wage and hour protec-
tions. Over the last twelve years, the Public Safety Employer-
" See 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177 (written testimony of William Banks) (citing
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) &
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)), available at http://edworkforce.
house.gov/ testimony/060507WilliamBanksTestimony.pdf.
179 H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 18-19 (citation omitted) (citing Darby, 312 U.S. 100 &
Wickard, 317 U.S. 111).
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Employee Cooperation Act has garnered the support of no
less fifty and as many as two-hundred and seventy-four co-
sponsors. It is clear that not only a majority of the Congress,
but the majority in this country support extending collective
bargaining rights to public safety officers.m
A great deal of discussion during the subcommittee hearing on
House Bill 980 regarding the constitutional basis for the PSEEC Act did
not concern the Commerce Clause, but instead focused on national
defense. 181
 Witnesses testified that public safety officers were the first
responders on September 11th and during Hurricane Katrina, and one
firefighters' union representative asserted in written testimony that
"[ii n light of the new, expansive federal role in Homeland Security, we
do not believe any constitutional challenge would succeed."182
 The
Committee Report relied heavily on this testimony; and, although the
Report tied homeland security concerns to its Commerce Clause rea-
soning, national defense is also ubiquitous throughout the document
as an independent source of authority for the Act. 183
 Most notably; the
Report asserts: .
The federal government has a compelling interest in pro-
tecting the rights of public safety officers as part of protecting
homeland security. The Public Safety Employer-Employee
Cooperation Act intends to help ensure the effective delivery
of emergency services by establishing minimal standards for
collective bargaining between public safety employees and
their employers.
The federal government utilizes local emergency response
personnel to carry out federal disaster response activities,
both at home and abroad and it retains the authority to send
local government employees anywhere they are needed. Since
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress and the
President have given significant attention to the role of first
responders in the nation's homeland security efforts.lM
188 Id. at 19 (citing Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 969 U.S. 528 (1985)).
181
 See 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177 (testimony of Kevin O'Connor, Assistant to
the General President, International Association of Firefighters, and Paul Nunziato, Vice
President, Port Authority Police Benevolent Association).
182
 See id. (written testimony of Kevin O'Connor), available at http://edworkforce.house.
gov/testimony/060507Kevin0ConnorTestimony.pdf.
' 83 See H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 12-13, 15, 17-18.
04
	at17 .
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The text of House Bill 980 and Senate Bill 2123, along with their
legislative histories, to date, reveal that Congress is attempting to invoke
two sources of authority to enact the PSEEC Act: the Commerce Clause
and '`national defense" authority.' 85 As for the former, Congress has as-
serted that the types of situations to which public safety officers respond
(e.g., terrorist attacks and natural disasters) have adverse effects on in-
terstate commerce. 186 Imposing collective bargaining on the employers
of public safety officers (i.e., states and their localities), Congress be-
lieves, will improve morale and working conditions and will improve the
delivery of emergency services." 37 Thus, according to Congress,. the
PSEEC Act will mitigate any potential adverse effects on interstate com-
merce posed by unhappy first responders.'" As for "national defense,"
Congress has. asserted that public safety officers play a role in the federal
government's national emergency prevention and response efforts and,
therefore, imposing collective bargaining is in furtherance of those ef-
forts. 189
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED BY THE PUBLIC SAFETY
EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE COOPERATION ACT
The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act ("PSEEC
Act" or the Act), passed by the House of Representatives in July 2007
as House Bill 980 and currently pending in the Senate as Senate Bill
2123, raises several constitutional questions, each of which threatens
the Act's validity.l 9° Chief among these is the source of Congress's au-
thority to enact the legislation. 191 The two sources of authority readily
185 See S. 2123 § 2(2), (4); H.R. 980 § 2(2), (5); 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177; H.R.
Ker. No. 110-232, at 12-13, 17-19; see also supra notes 167-184 and accompanying text.
' 86 See S. 2123 §§ 2(4). 4; H.R. 980 §§ 2(5), 5; 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177; H.R.
REP. No. 110-232, at 18-19.
167 See S. 2123 §§ 2(4), 4; H.R. 980 §§ 2 (5), 5; 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177; H.R.
REP. No. 110-232, at 18-19.
ma See S. 2123 §§ 2(4), 4; H.R. 980 §§ 2(5), 5; 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177; H.R.
REP. No. 110-232, at 18-19; see also supra notes 170-173,177-180, and accompanying text.
189 See S. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2); 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177; H.R. Rer. No.
110-232, at 12-13,15,17-18; see also supra notes 174-176,181-184, and accompanying text.
19° See United States is Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,617-18 (2000); Printz v. United States,
521 U.S. 898,935 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,566-67 (1995); New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144,181-83 (1992); Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation
Act, S. 2123, 110th Cong. (2007); Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, H.R.
980, 110th Cong. (2007).
' 9 ' See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Prins; 521 U.S. at 935; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67; New
Yogi, 505 U.S. at 181-83. In addition to Congress's ability to enact the PSEEC Act in the first
instance, the federal government's ability to enforce the Act may also present constitutional
issues under the Eleventh Amendment, which, in certain cases, excludes the states from the
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apparent from the Act itself—the Commerce Clause and "national
defense" authority—do not provide solid footing; Congress's ability to
regulate the states' and their localities' employment of public safety
officers is doubtful under either source. 192 This Part examines the vi-
ability of the PSEEC Act tinder both the Commerce Clause and na-
tional defense authority. 193
 First, this Part argues that public safety
employment does not substantially affect interstate commerce and,
thus, does not fall within the purview of the Commerce Clause.'"
Next, this Part argues that, even if such employment substantially af-
fects interstate commerce, the Supreme Court would likely hold the
PSEEC Act barred by virtue of state sovereignty.'" Finally, this Part
argues that Congress's national defense and national emergency pow-
ers are not sufficient to empower enactment of the Act because, first,
the federal government does not play a primary role in emergency
responses 196
 and, second, even if the federal government did assert a
primary role, Congress could not compel state and local public safety
officers to carry out any federal directives. 197
A. Problems Under the Commerce Clause
I. Public Safety Employment Does Not Substantially Affect Interstate
Commerce
For Congress to regulate a local activity under the Commerce
Clause, that activity must "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 198
jurisdiction of federal courts. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44,47 (1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate a state's Eleventh Amend-
ment sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause). This issue was addressed in the
House subcommittee hearing on House Bill 980 but was left out of the majority portion of
the Committee Report. See 2007 House Hearing, supra note 177 (written testimony of Neil
Reichenberg, Executive Director, International Public Management Association for Human
Resources), available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/testbnony/060507NeilReichenberg
Testimony.pdf; id. (written testimony of R. Theodore Clark, jr., Partner, Seyfarth Shaw LLP),
available at http://edworkforce.house.gov/ testimony/060507RTheodoreClarkTestirnony.pdf;
see also H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 18-20 (2007). But see id. at 33-34 (discussing the sovereign
immunity issue from the minority's view).
192 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18; Prints, 521 U.S. at 935; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566-67;
New York, 505 U.S. at 181-83.
193 See infra notes 198-252 and accompanying text.
194 See infra notes 198-217 and accompanying text.
195 See infra notes 218-228 and accompanying text.
198 See infra notes 232-245 and accompanying text.
197 See infra notes 246-252 and accompanying text.
199
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,16-17 (2005); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09; Lopez, 514
U.S. at 558-59.
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In 1995, in United States v. Lopez, and in 2000, in United States v. Mani-
son, the Supreme Court delineated the limits of this power, holding
that the activity must be economic and that its connection to the in-
terstate or national market cannot be so attenuated as to obliterate
the historical limits on federal authority) 99 Under this standard, it is
not clear that the pending PSEEC Act, seeking to regulate the em-
ployment of states' and localities' law enforcement officers, firefight-
ers, and emergency medical services workers, would regulate an activ-
ity that "substantially affects" interstate commerce. 200
First, public safety employment does not seem to satisfy the Su-
preme Court's understanding of an "economic activity."20 Police work,
firefighting, and emergency medical services are not economic enter-
prises or activities arising out of commercial transactions but are public
services provided by states and localities to their citizens. 202 Further-
more, in imposing a collective bargaining requirement on states, the
PSEEC Act would not be regulating the production, distribution, or
consumption of any commodity for which there is an interstate mar-
ke t.20
Even the House of Representatives, in passing House Bill 980, did
not assert that public safety is an economic activity. 204 Instead, the
House, through its Committee Report, simply attempted to draw the
connection between public safety employment and interstate com-
merce: public safety officers are first responders to terrorist attacks and
natural disasters, and terrorist attacks and natural disasters incur high
economic costs, which affect the interstate market for goods and ser-
vices. 205 This is precisely the sort of "remote chain of inferences" that
the Supreme Court has twice rejected. 206 In Lopez, the Court refused to
accept the argument that guns near schools affect interstate commerce
because the guns might cause commerce-affecting violence or might
result in a less educated, and thus less productive, citizenry. 207 In Mani-
199 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-13; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-67.
200 See Alorrison, 529 U.S. at 611; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567; see also S. 2123 §§ 4-5; H.R. 980
§§ 4-5 -
2°' See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 613; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
202 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
2°3 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
204 See generally H.R. REP. No. 110-232.
205 See id. at 19.
2°° See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 515 U.S. at 563-64; see also Raich, 545 U.S. at
36 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("In Lopez and Morrison, the Court rejected the argument
that Congress may regulate noneconomic activity based solely on the effect that it may have
on interstate commerce through a remote chain of inferences.").
2°7 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 563-64.
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son, the Court rejected a congressional finding that gender-motivated
violence deters victims from engaging in interstate commercial activi-
ties. 208 In both cases, the Court reasoned that if it sanctioned the gov-
ernment's arguments, then Congress's Commerce Clause power would
be virtually limitless because any activity that could affect a school or
influence an individual's choice to engage in interstate business would
be subject to congressional regulation. 209
 Similarly, the reasoning be-
hind the PSEEC Act would allow Congress to regulate any activity with a
possible connection to the aftermath of a natural disaster or terrorist
attack—which is, of course, any activity. 210
The only way that public safety employment could be regulated
by Congress under the Commerce Clause, therefore, would be to
characterize that employment as part of a "class of activities" substan-
tially affecting interstate commerce, as articulated by the Supreme
Court in 2005, in Gonzales v. Raich. 211
 Because Congress already regu-
lates private employment under the Commerce Clause through the
National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA") in a manner similar to that in
which the PSEEC Act would regulate public safety employment—
private employers must participate in collective bargaining with their
employees' unions212—one might argue, under Raich, that similar
regulation of all employment is necessary to achieve the overall pur-
pose of the NLRA.219
 The purpose of the NLRA, however—and the
basis on which the Supreme Court found it constitutional—is to miti-
gate the effects of "industrial strife" on interstate commerce. 2 t 4
 Police
officers, firefighters, and emergency medical services workers, of
course, cannot engage in industrial strife.215
 To the extent that the
term may be interpreted to mean labor strikes, generally, public safety
officers are almost universally already barred from engaging in strikes
under state law, and the PSEEC Act itself would bar public safety
208 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
409 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
200
 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564.
211 See545 U.S. at 17.
212 See National Labor Relations Act §§ 7-8,29 U.S.C. §§ 157-158 (2000).
213 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 18-19,23-24.
214 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 ("The denial by some employers of the right of employees to
organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collective bargain-
ing lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent or
the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce ...."); NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1,41-42 (1937).
213 See 29 U.S.C. § 151;Jones &Laughlin, 301 U.S. at 41-42.
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strikes.216 Additionally, the Supreme Court would have to extend its
Raich holding, which concerned the regulation of a commodity for
which there was a national market, to cover the PSEEC Act, which
would regulate employment for non-commercial purposes. 217
2. State Sovereignty May Bar Congressional Use of the Commerce
Clause to Regulate Public Safety Employment
Even if the PSEEC Act represents a valid exercise of the Commerce
Clause power insofar as public safety employment substantially affects
interstate commerce, Congress's authority to regulate the states and
their localities directly under the Commerce Clause is not clear. 218 In
some way, the shift in the Supreme Court's Commerce Clause jurispru-
dence in Lopez and Morrison was in response to the Court's 1985 deci-
sion in Garcia u San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, which held
that state sovereignty cannot prevent Congress from regulating the
states under the Commerce Clause. 219 In his dissent in that case, Justice
Powell stated:
In National League of Cities, we spoke of fire prevention, po-
lice protection, sanitation, and public health as "typical of
[the services] performed by state and local governments in
discharging their dual functions of administering the public
law and furnishing public services." Not only are these activities
remote from any normal concept of interstate commerce, they are also
activities that epitomize the concerns of local, democratic self-
govern men t.22°
In fact, the current Commerce Clause jurisprudence may be, in part,
an attempt to rein in congressional regulation of state employment. 221
218 See S. 2123 § 6(a); H.R. 980 § 6; Michael A. DiSabatino, Annotation, Who Are Employ-
ees Forbidden to Strike Under State Enactments or Slate Common-Law Rules Prohibiting Strikes by
Public Employees or Stated Classes of Public Employees, 22 A.L.R.4th 1103 §§ 5, 8 (1983 &
Stipp. 2007).
217 See Reich, 545 U.S. at 18-19.
218 See New Yolk 505 U.S. at 177-78, 182-83; Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 530-31 (1985); Nat'l League of Cities V. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 835-37
(1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
219 See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 548-50; id. at 575 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 583-87
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220 Id. at 575 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting Nat? League, 426 U.S. at 851) (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
221 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 583-87
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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Justice O'Connor, in her Garcia dissent, characterized the majority's
dismissal of judicially enforced state sovereignty as reneging on a
promise to the states.222
 Justice O'Connor believed that the Court had
assumed the duty to protect the states' sovereignty from the ever-
growing federal government by limiting the reach of otherwise valid
federal regulation but that, in Garcia, it was shirking that responsibil-
ity.223 In Lopez and Morrison, Justice O'Connor, in joining the Court's
majority opinions, was able to protect the states from the other side—
by halting the continued growth of federal regulation. 224
In the majority opinion in New York, however, Justice O'Connor
seemed to go even further in suggesting the Court's willingness to re-
turn to the pre-Garcia conception of state sovereignty as a bar to federal
regulation. 225
 New York undermined Garcia significantly by asserting the
ditty of courts to protect the status of states in the federalist system. 226
Additionally, the Court in New York, and again five years later in Printz v.
United States, refused to recognize that states are necessarily subject to
generally applicable federal labor laws, by simply stating that the issue
has been "unsteady" in the Court. 227
 The PSEEC Act would certainly
give the courts an opportunity to address this question directly, and
when confronted with regulation of police officers, firefighters, and
emergency medical services workers, rather than transit employees, the
Supreme Court would very likely reject Garcia expressly and strike
down the legislation on state sovereignty grounds. 223
222 See 469 U.S. at 583-84 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). justice O'Connor stated,
This Court has been increasingly generous in its interpretation of the com-
merce power of Congress, primarily to assure that the National Government
would be able to deal with national economic problems „
Incidental to this expansion of the commerce power, Congress has been
given an ability it lacked prior to the emergence of an integrated national
economy. Because virtually every state activity, like virtually every activity of a
private individual, arguably '`affects" interstate commerce, Congress can now
supplant the States from the significant sphere of activities envisioned for
them by the Framers ....
It would be erroneous, however, to conclude that the Supreme Court was
blind to the threat to federalism when it expanded the commerce power.
Id.
223 See id. at 587 ("This principle of state sovereignty] requires the Court to enforce
affirmative limits on federal regulation of the States to complement the judicially crafted
expansion of the interstate commerce power.").
224 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-16; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-67.
225 See New York 505 U.S. at 177-78,182-83.
226 See id. at 181-83.
227 See id. at 160; see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 932.
228 See New Yin*, 505 U.S. at 177-78,182-83.
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B. Problems Under "National Defense" Authority
In addition to the Commerce Clause, House Bill 980 and Senate
Bill 2123 invoke congressional power to provide for the national de-
fense as another source of authority for the PSEEC Act. 229 Insofar as the
bills describe local public safety officers as first responders in national
emergencies, the bills seem to perceive local police officers, fffefight-
ers, and emergency medical services workers as agents of the federal
government in times of emergency, with duties to protect federal prop-
erty and to take on federal responsibilities. 250 The problems with this
approach to asserting federal authority over state employer-employee
labor relations are that it mischaracterizes the federal role in responses
to national emergencies and that it presupposes a federal function for
state and local public safety officers in the face of those emergencies. 231
1. The Federal Government Does Not Play a Primary Role in
Responses to and Preparedness for National Emergencies
First, regardless of whether the federal government can act as the
first responder to a national emergency, in practice it does not. 232 Con-
gress has given federal agencies only a secondary role in emergencies,
and, under current law, federal assistance—for both preparedness ef-
forts and actual emergency response—can be provided to states and
their localities only upon the states' request. 233 Thus, the House of Rep-
resentatives' Committee Report assertion that the "federal government
utilizes local emergency response personnel to carry out federal disas-
ter response activities" 234 is not accurate because, in fact, the reverse is
true: state and local governments use federal personnel and money to
assist them in carrying out their emergency response activities. 235
This inaccuracy in characterization leads to an inconsistency with
the language of Senate Bill 2123, which states that local public safety
officers are a "component" of the National Incident Management Sys-
tem ("NIMS").236 They are a "component" only insofar as they have
229 SeeS. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
239 SeeS. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
231 See supra notes 119-152 and accompanying text.
232 See generally Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207 (West 2000 & Stipp. 2008).
233 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5170, 5170b(c), 5191(a).
234 H.R. REP. No. 110-232, at 17.
2s5 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5170, 5170b(c), 5191(a).
gas
	 S. 2123 § 2(2).
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agreed to participate. 237
 As with all existing federal national emergency
programs involving states, the federal government compels the states'
NIMS participation by conditioning federal money on participation, 238
which is a legitimate exercise of Congress's Spending Clause power. 233
The ability to condition federal money, however, is not unlimited: any
condition on the states' acceptance of federal funds must be explicit
prior to the states' acceptance of the conditioned funds. 24° To the ex-
tent that Senate Bill 2123 invokes NIMS participation as a basis for im-
posing collective bargaining on states and their localities, the PSEEC
Act effectively would impose an additional condition—collective bar-
gaining—on NIMS-linked funds after the states have accepted federal
money and without the opportunity to withdraw from the scheme alto-
gether. 24 i
In fact, neither the House nor the Senate version of the PSEEC
Act actually purports to impose a funding condition. 242
 Instead, both
bills simply ignore the legal authority for the federal government's
national emergency response and preparedness efforts: the Spending
Clause. 243 Congress could, perhaps, prescribe a first responder role
for the federal government: 244
 however, the PSEEC Act itself would
not achieve this by merely mischaracterizing the current reality. 243
2. The Federal Government Cannot Compel State and Local Public Safety
Officers to Carry Out Federal Responses to National Emergencies
Second, even assuming that the federal government does or could
have a primary role in preparing for and responding to national emer-
gencies, any use of state and local police officers, firefighters, and
emergency medical services workers to carry out such a role would di-
rectly contradict the Supreme Court's anti-commandeering jurispru-
257 See HSPD-5, supra note 134, at 230, 233.
2" See id.; see also 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5207.
2S9 See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text (discussing conditional grants as an
exercise of the Spending Clause).
248
 Sec South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987); see also CHEMERINSKV, supra
note 125, § 3.4.3, at 279-81,
241 See Dole, 983 U.S. at 207-08; S. 2123 §§ 3-4; HSPD-5, supra note 134, at 233.
242 See generally S. 2123; H.R. 980.
"5 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5170, 5170b(c), 5191(a); HSPD-5, supra note 134, at 233.
244
 Cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967); Ibungstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952); United States v. Peace Info. Ctr., 97 F.
Supp. 255, 261-62 (D.D.C. 1951).
245 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5170, 5170b(c), 5191(a); S. 2123 §§ 3-4; H.R. 980 §§ 3-4; HSPD-
5, supra note 134, at 1747.
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deuce. 246
 The current versions of the PSEEC Act, however, seem to en-
vision just that: they characterize local public safety officers as agents of
the federal government in carrying out federal emergency responses. 247
But not only do local public safety officers not carry out federal re-
sponses to national emergencies, 248 they cannot be forced to do so.249
The Court has expressly held that the federal government cannot
compel state or local officials to carry out federal programs because the
Constitution reserves the exercise of federal executive power to the
federal executive branch and recognizes that the sovereignty of both
the states and the federal government prevents either from pressing
the other's officials into its service. 250 Police officers, firefighters, and
emergency medical services workers, as state officials, are neither part of
the federal executive branch nor subject to impressment by the federal
government; therefore, Congress could never require them to partici-
pate or take on a federal role in any federal emergency response activi-
ties. 25 ' Thus, the PSEEC Act's premise that Congress is regulating the
employment of personnel who might be brought into federal service is
constitutionally impossible and cannot serve as a legitimate source of
authority for enactment of the legislation. 252
CONCLUSION
The Public Safety Employer-Employee Cooperation Act, which
was passed by the House of Representatives and is currently pending
in the Senate, would require states and their localities to engage in
collective bargaining with their police officers', firefighters', and
emergency medical services workers' unions. The Act is constitution-
ally suspect because Congress does have the authority to enact the
legislation, either under the Commerce Clause or under its "national
defense" power. The Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate
activities substantially affecting interstate commerce (i.e., economic
endeavors with a direct impact on interstate commercial activity).
Employment of public safety officers does not squarely fit within this
grant of legislative authority. Even if the Commerce Clause could be
understood to permit Congress to reach an activity such as public
248 Sce Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
247 Sec S. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
24a See supra notes 232-245 and accompanying text.
249 Scc Print; 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
25° Printz, 521 U.S. at 918-25, 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
251 Sec Mintz, 521 U.S. at 918-25, 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
252 Sec Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; New York, 505 U.S. at 188; S. 2123 § 2(2); H.R. 980 § 2(2).
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safety officer employment, however, state sovereignty would probably
act as a bar to the legislation's enforceability against states and their
localities. Although the Supreme Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro-
politan Transit Anthwity held that state employers are subject to gener-
ally applicable federal labor regulations enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, the Court has reasserted its role as a guardian of
state sovereignty in more recent cases, including New York v. United
States, and has largely abandoned the reasoning underpinning its Gar-
cia holding. Given the opportunity, which this legislation would af-
ford, the Court would likely resurrect its pre-Garcia conceptions of
state sovereignty and strike down the Act.
Furthermore, as an exercise of "national defense" authority, the
Act would also fail. Congress's ability to regulate domestic activities un-
der this power is ill-defined, but the fact that Congress has never before
invoked the power to regulate state public safety officers suggests that
the power is insufficient to permit congressional regulation of public
safety employment. The way in which Congress has historically inserted
itself into state-level public safety concerns is through its ability to con-
dition federal money on local compliance with federal policies. This
Act is not conditional but, mischaracterizing the federal role in na-
tional emergencies, would impose federal policies directly on states and
their localities. In addition, the Act presupposes that state public safety
officers act as agents of the federal government in times of national
emergencies. But the Supreme Court has not permitted the use of state
officials to carry out federal programs, and, thus, the Act's very premise
is unconstitutional. If the Act were to pass in the Senate and become
law, the Supreme Court likely would—and should—strike it down.
KEVIN J. O'BRIEN
